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NOTES AND COIMENT
ADMiSSIBILITY OP EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION OF THE PLACE IN
"JOINTIST"

CAsEs---Reputation is the reputed character of the

person or thing in the community as evidenced by the conversion
of those acquainted with him or it.' Reputation, when offered as
*The Scope of this note is limited to evidence of reputation of the
place operated in criminal actions, for the maintenance of a "joint" or
liquor nuisance and in actions in abatement, against the owner of the
premises or the person operating the alleged nuisance excluding all questions involving the reputation of the place or of the defendant in other
types of liquor violation cases.
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evidence of the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay 2-termed
"composite hearsay" by some authorities-and is, in keeping with
the general rules excluding hearsay evidence, primarily inadmissible unless the facts of the case bring it within certain recognized
4
exceptions to the general rule.
Dean Wigmore has stated 5 that any evidence of reputation must
fall into one of three classes, s.e., where it is offered 6 (1) as evidentiary of defendant's character, to show the doing or not-doing of
an act by him,7 or (2) to show character of person or thing as evidentiary for any other purpose," or (3) where reputation of the
person or thing is, under the legal principles and pleadings of the
case, one of the issues.9
Reputation evidence of the first class is eliminated from consideration as this concerns only reputation of defendant himself
and the question here involves solely reputation of place.
Cases falling within the third class are those wherein the ultimate
fact to be proved is the repute rather than the actual character."
The statutes1 regulating the operation of liquor nuisances in all
staets prohibit the maintenance of a place where intoxicating
liquors are sold or kept or consumed but are not framed to prohibit
the operation of a place where it is reputed that such liquors are
sold or kept. Consequently, the character and not the reputation
of such places is the direct issue and these cases do not fall under
this classification.
I For a clear understanding, the reader must be cognizant of the technical distinction between "character" and "reputation" The words are
here used in their more technical sense rather than in their more loose
popular sense, which is also often used in the cases. See I WIGHORE,
EViDEnCE 265, § 52, for discussion of the distinction; also 3 WiGmoBE,
EVIDENCE, § 1608. In State v. Pickett, 202 Ia. 1321, 210 N. W 782 (1926)
it was said,"Character and reputation, briefly stated, are distinguishable
in that character refers to what a person actually is while reputation is
what is said of him by his neighbors."
2WIGiuORE, EVIDENCE, 357, § 1609; WHARTON, CRIM EVIDENCE, § 255.
122 C. J. 211 § 170; CHAMBERLAYNE, HANDBOOK EviD. 777, § 1037.
3 WiGmoBE, EVIDENCE 3, § 1362.
I WIGMUOBE, EVIDENCE, § 54.
'It is to be noted that there is a distinction between the first two of
these classes and the third class in the purpose for which the evidence is
offered. In the first two classes the evidence is offered as circumstantially
evidentiary of a fact to be established, in the third class the reputation
itself is the thing in issue, and which must be proved.
I WIGORE,EVIDENCE, 268 et seg.

Ibid., 300, § 69.
9 Ibid., 301, §70 et seq.

10IWIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 315 § 78; 18 C. J. 1267, and cases note 67
1 WHARTON, CRIM. EVIDENCE 486, §§ 260, 261, 1 WHARTON, CRI. EVIDENCE
481, § 255.
u See note 22, snfra..

NOTES AND COMMENT
Thus it will be seen that if evidence of the reputation of a place
which it is alleged the defendant maintains for the purpose of
illegal sale of intoxicating liquors is to be adussible it must be
for some purpose falling under Wigiore's second class of evidence
of reputation-to show character of person or thing as circumstantially evidentiary of a fact in issue.
While disorderly house eases are apparently analogous to
"joint" cases their authority cannot be blindly relied upon."2 Some
of these cases lay down the true rule,13 but others are absolutely
wrong on principle ;14 some are governed by the wording of the
statute under which action is brought, 5 and in still others, such
evidence is admitted solely because it is made competent by
statute.1 6 Any such case' 7 must be carefully scrutinized as to
facts and reasons before it can be safely cited as authority for the
adnissibility of evidence of reputation of a place in a case involvThe same basic principles are
ing a liquor nuisance or "joint"
22The great majority of cases involving disorderly houses in the U. S.
have held that evidence of reputation of the house is admissible to prove
the character of the house. These can be divided into three classes: (1)
where the ultimate fact to be proved is the "ill fame" of the house rather
than its character" (2) where such evidence is made competent by statute;
and (3) where courts permitted such evidence in proof of character of
disorderly house, failing or refusing to recognize the distinction between a
disorderly house and a house of "ill fame" Cases of the first and second
class are undoubtedly correct upon principle but those of the third class
cannot be accorded such support. But see Wigmore's statement commented upon in note 28, inlra.
As distinguished from the cases of the third class there are a number
of cases of. the same type in which such evidence has been held incompetent upon the ground that it is hearsay and inadmissible to prove the
fact itself in the absence of statute permitting it. It is submitted that
these cases are correct on principle.
1' 18 C. J. 1266 and cases there cited, note 47. 36 YALE L. Jou. 144.
State v.
"Batesville v. Smyth, 138 Ark. 276, 211 S. W 140 (1919)
Fleeman, 102 Kans. 670, 171 Pac. 618 (1918) King v. Comm., 154 Ky. 829,
159 S. W 593 (1913) Egan v. Gordon, 65 Minn. 505, 68 N. W 103 (1896)
Putnam v. State, 9
State v. Hendricks, 15 Mont. 194, 39 Pac. 94 (1895)
and many others. See note, 50 Am.
Okla. Cr. 535, 132 Pac. 693 (1913)
Rep. 209.
15See note 10, supra. Also, 1 WiGmOBE, EVIDENCE, 316, § 78 (a) and
cases there cited, note 1. However it has been held that even in such a
case the evidence is inadmissible. State v. Plant, 67 Vt. 454, 32 AtI. 237,
48 Am. St. Rep. 821 (1895).
"1MCKELVEY, EVIDENCE, 317, .cases noted, note 7, 3 WIGuORE, EVIDENCE,
373, § 1620 (2), wherein statutes are mentioned.
21In the three classes mentioned in note 12, supra, where such evidence is held admissible, the question also arises as to whether reputation evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. See note,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 593. Usually, in these cases, the reason it is first admitted is not mentioned-and the decision is consequently misleading unless closely analyzed.
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found in each type of case and it is a similar erroneous application
of principles that must be watched for in both types.
Before any evidence which is contrary to the hearsay rule may
be admitted there must be two essential requirements fulfilled, 8
i. e., (1) the principle of circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness,' 9 and (2) the principle of necessity 20
Evidence of general reputation in the community satisfies the
principle of trustworthiness.21 The real question, then, narrows
itself down to the determination of whether or not there is any
necessity for the admission of such evidence as evidentiary of a
material issue in the case.
An examination of the statutes 22 which prohibit liquor joints and
liquor nuisances reveals that, generally stated, the material issues
to be proved are (1) that defendant operates or as owner or agent
has knowledge of the operation of (2) a place wherein intoxicating
liquors are sold, kept, or consumed on the premises.
First, as to the character of the place. Evidence of reputation
offered for the purpose of proving its character is offered for the
truth of the matter therein stated and falls within the hearsay rule.
Then, the question is, is there such a necessity for this type of proof
as to permit its use in contravention to this rule.
The decisions on this point may be divided into three classes
(1) where such evidence has, on common law principles, been held
inadmissible;22 (2) where such evidence has, without a statute
making it competent, been declared admissible; and (3) where
such evidence has been admitted because of a statute declaring it
25
competent for that purpose.
18
2

3

WIGMORE, EvIDENcE

153; Id., 329.

IbN., 155, § 1422.
lbud., § 1421.
-IbNd., 359, § 1610 (2).

2 U. S. (Volstead Act) Oct. 28, 1918, c. 85, Title 2, § 21, 41 Stat. 314,
U. S. C., Title 27, § 33.
CAL. General Laws, 1923, Act 3784, General Laws, 1923, Act 3778.
ILL. 3 Callaghan's Ill. Stat. (1926) § 2740.
IowA CODE 1924, §§ 1924, 2017.
KAxs. Rev. Stat. 1923, §§ 2130-31, 2136-37.
OKLA. Comp. Stat. 1921, § 7022.
TEXAS. Pen. Code 1911, §§ 496, 500.
WASH. Rem. Comp. Stat. 1922, § 7328.
Wyo. Laws 1921, c. 117, § 20.
(Above are statutes cited in cases here mentioned. Other statutes
Many states have remay be obtained by reference to various codes.
enacted the Volstead Act, as may be seen by reference to above.)
=See note 26, znfra.
"See note 29, snfra.
21See note 34, sufra.

NOTES AND COMMENT
It is submitted that cases of the first class are, on principle and
reasons, correct.2 6 The legislature has declared that the act prohibited is the keeping of a place of the character named, not the
keeping of a place reputed to be of such character. There is no
necessity for the admission of such evidence for this use is capable
of being proved by direct evidence 27 by proof of, sales of liquor at
the place, and by other physical acts of the defendants or his
agents.
For the same reason, it must follow that cases of the second
class are, on principle, wrong.2-8 The departure from common law
principle can be traced in practically all instances to an original
"People v. Johnson, 63 Cal. App. 178, 218 Pac. 449 (1923) Shacklett
v. State, 195 Ind. 436, 145 N. E. (1924) Wrench v. State, 198 Ind. 61,
152 N. B. 274 (1926) State v. Fleming, 86 Iowa 294, 53 N. W 234 (1892)
Cook 'v. Comm., 159 Ky. 839, 169 S. W 553 (1914) Comm. v. Eagan, 151
Mass. 45, 23 N. E. 494 (1890) Comm. v. Nagle, 157 Mass. 554, 32 N. E. 861
(1893) Cronin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 278, 171 S.W 410 (1891) (gambling)
Trayhan v. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W 656 (1915) Anderson v.
State, (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W 648 (1915) State v. Radoff, 140 Wash.
202, 248 Pac. 405 (1926) State v. Fairfield, 143 Wash. 355, 255 Pac. 661
(1927) affirming 140 Wash. 349, 248 Pac. 810 (1926) (dictum) State 'V.
Longpre and Cameron, 35 Wyo. 482, 251 Pac. 468 (1927) (very good anlysis and review of authorities; 37 H.&nv. L. REv. 385, 2 McLAxi, CBIM.
LAw §§ 1249, 1279; dissenting opinion of Davidson, J., in Joliff 'v. State,
53 Tex. Cr. R. 61, 109 S. W 181 (1908).
1 WHATOw, Cwrm. EviD. 486,
213 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE 375, § 1620 (3)
§ 260.
2 But see statements of text-writers: 4 CHAMBERLAYNE, MOD. LAW OF
Evm. 3774 § 2745, BLAXF0hRrOB, PnoHmrrtox 341, 3 WIGOOS, EVIDENCF 373,
§ 1620 (2) 33 C. J. 698 and note 73. An examination of the cases cited
in support of the statements will reveal that these conclusions are not well
founded. Wigmore's belief that there is a necessity because of inability
to obtain direct evidence does not seem to have the support of the courts,
and in the cases he cites, note 7, with but few exceptions, the evidence is
admitted because of statutory provision.
-' State v. Mercier, 70 Mont. 333, 225 Pac. 802 (1924) (citing Tenn.
and Ia. cases where admitted under statute and 33 C. J. 698, mentioned
supra,note 28) Ostendorfer v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 360, 128 Pac. 143 (1912)
Titsworth 'v. State, 2 Okla. 282, 101 Pac. 288, 293 (1909) Carrol v. State,
4 Okla. Cr. 242, 111 Pac. 1021 (1910) Ward v. State, 15 Okla. Cr. 150, 175
Pac. 557 (1918) Sibelaner vV.State, 16 Okla. Cr. 576, 185 Pac. 448 (1919)
Tincell 'v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 721, 196 Pac. 555 (1921) Williams 'v. State,
(0kla. Cr. App.) 220 Pac. 667 (1923) (semble) Barngrover 'v. State,
(Okla. Cr. App.) 229 Pac. 301 (1924) (compare with disorderly house
252 Pac. 442
cases, note 12, supra) Sullivan 'v. State, . Okla. Cr. ..
(1927) Taylor v. State, .. Okla. Cr. .... 255 Pac. 714, Ryan 'v. U. S., 285

Fed. 734 (1923) Merrill v. U. S., 6 F (2d) 120 (1925) Chapman 'v. U. S.,
9 F (2d) 790 (1926) Maki v. U. S., 12 F (2d) 668 (1926) (all of above
Federal cases without giving reasons therefor and with little citation of
authority, all of which could be distinguished from their holdings).
Washington cases cited in note 36, -infra,wherein evidence was admitted
without comment as to basis therefor have been so cited, and the language
used is so ambiguous as to well merit such interpretation.
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unwarranted reliance upon decisions in disorderly house

cases

2 9

or to pure judicial legislation."
Likewise, for the reasons above stated, the cases of the third
class are correct on principle."' Here the legislature has declared
that the necessity exists.
Second, as to whether or not the defendant maintains or operates or as owner or agent has knowledge of the maintenance or
operation.
Clearly, the reputation of the place is of no probative value as
evidence of the fact, if it be one, that the particular defendant
charged actually operates or maintains the place,3 2 and is thus
generally excluded.
But when the question is, not whether this defendant actually
operates the place but, whether he knew that it was being so oper
ated by another with whom he is m privity, there is need to prove
a state of mind existing at a particular time. For this purpose it
has been admitted in intoxicating liquor cases, both equitable and
criminal.

33

'An examination of the first three Oklahoma cases cited in note 29,
supra, reveals an interesting story of how one judge impressed the court
with his own opinions on the subject, and established the rule by citing
his own obiter statements.
'Shtdeler
v. Naughton, 163 Ia. 616, 145 N. W 280 (1914) (Code, §§
2406, 2431) State v. Anderson, 188 Ia. 626, 176 N. W 637 (1920) McMillan v. Sumner 190 Ia. 1108, 181 N. W 464 (1921) State v. Pickett,

202 Ia. 1321, 210 N. W 782 (1926) (Code 1924, § 2053) State v. James,
202 Ia. 1137, 211 N. W 372 (1927) (Code 1924, § 2022) Burns Ann. Ind.

Stat. (1926) § 2744, State v. Kingston, 5 R. I. 297 (1858) (Rev. St. c. 73,
§ 3) State v. Wilson, 15 R. I. 180, 1 Atl. 415 (1885) (Pub. St. c. 80, § 3)
Webber v. State,
Joliff v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 61, 109 S. W 176 (1908)
O'Brien v. State, 55 Tex. Or. R.
(Tex. Cr. App.) 109 S. W 182 (1908)
431, 117 S. W 133 (1909) Bumbaugz v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 55, 126 S. W
1139 (1910)
Pace v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 454, 156 S. W 1192 (1913)
Claunch V.
Johnson v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 107, 153 S. W 875 (1913)
State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 97§, 204 S. W 436 (1918) (Pen. Code 1911, § 500)
323 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 339 and cases there cited, note 8; 3 JouxEs,
Com. oN Evm., 1995.
"Brown v. State, 196 Ind. 77, 197 N. E. 136 (1925) State v. Brooks, 74
Kans. 175, 85 Pac. 1013 (1906)
State v. Young, 72 Mont. 408, 234 Pac. 248
(1925)
State v. Perrin, 127 Wash. 193, 220 Pac. 772 (1923) (Court says

"
It was essential that the state in order to convict, should prove that
they had knowledge that such sales were being made. This proof might

have been made by showing actual knowledge of the appellants, or presumptive knowledge flowing from the fact, if it be one, that the place

with which they were connected had the reputation of being one where

people resorted for the purpose of obtaining and drinking intoxicating

liquors.") State v. Anderson, note 36, nlra, State v. Kallas, note 36, tnfra
(see also note 37, sn!ra) State v. Radoff, note 40, snfra, State v. Espeland,
note 41, snfra, State v. Fatrfield, note 41, snfra, State v. Stuttard, note 43,
znfra, State v. Mavros, note 41, snfra, State v. Costello, note 41, %nfra,
State v. Longpre and Cameron, 35 Wyo. 482, 251 Pac. 468 (1927). Also, in
a number of late Oklahoma cases, cited note 29, supra, the evidence has

NOTES AND COMMENT
There is some controversy among legal writers as to the nature of
reputation evidence, when offered solely for the purpose of proving
knowledge. Some contend that when offered for that purpose it
isnot hearsay at all, others, that it is hearsay and admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule. 4 Important and differing consequences follow, depending upon whether it is regarded as the one
or the other. If it is not hearsay at all under such circumstances,
it should be-admissible if relevant regardless of the factor of necessity wnch underlies the exceptions to the hearsay rule. If, on the
other hand, it is hearsay and admissible as an exception, then the
admissibility of it must be worked out consistently with the principles governing hearsay exceptions, including the principle of
necessity
In Washington, the court has apparently taken the view that
reputation evidence for the purpose of proving knowledge is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, and has rendered a
number of decisions on this question which show rather unusual
developments and applications of the rule in this state.
The court, in State v. Perrn,8" the first case presented on this
question, held that the evidence was inadmissible to prove the
actual character of the place but was admissible in proof of knowbeen held admissible upon the ground that the crime is keeping a place

with intent to sell liquor and that such evidence is competent to prove the

intent with which the place is kept. However, the authorities do not recognize any such exception to the hearsay rule as one for the purpose of
proving intent. The reasoning of these cases seems no more satisfactory
than that pointed out in note 30, supra.
3.Upholding view that it is original evidence: 3 WiGmoRE, EVIDENcs,
819, § 1788; Id., 770, §1766, Id., 820, § 1789. Criticizing this viewEustace Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HAV. L. Rv.
146, 151 (1912) Win. G. Hale, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2
ILL. L. BumL. 65, 94 (1919).
In favor of the view that reputation evidence, when offered to show
knowledge, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule it may be
suggested that the issue to be proved is defendant's knowledge of the
actual character of the place. wvidence of the reputation of the place
can directly do no more than create an inference charging defendant
with the same knowledge of its reputed character that is had by the
community at large. But this will not convict him; he must have knowledge of the actual character. To use the reputation evidence, therefore, as
proving knowledge of the actual character of the place, requires the further inference that its reputed character is its actual character. If this
Is correct, then the statements concerning the reputation appear to be
used not as mere statements, the truth or falsity of which is immaterial,
but as true statements, with the knowledge of whose contents defendant
is charged.
23Note 33, supra.
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ledge. Then followed five cases 6 in which the evidence was declared admissible but in no one of these cases is it reported why
such evidence is admissible. In four of the cases 37 the Perrin case
is cited, so it must be assumed that it was admitted for the purpose
of proving knowledge. In the fifth case "I the evidence is merely
assumed to be admissible without reference to facts or authority
Following these cases the question was again considered in
State v Radoff 9 and the rule of the Perrin case reiterated and
a limitation placed upon the admissibility of reputation evidence
even to prove knowledge.40 This same rule of inadmissibility except to prove knowledge is recognized m all cases 4' which have been
decided since the Radoff case, and in several of these 2 the doctrine
that there are limitations upon its admissibility even for this purpose has been put forth.
In State v Stuttard,3 the last case m which the principle has
been discussed, the court, per Askren, J., in holding reputation
evidence inadmissible to prove knowledge where an actual sale
by defendant was shown, said .4
"We conceive a just rule to be that whenever the state
has shown a sale by a defendant or his presence at a sale
State v.
1State v. Anderson, 132 Wash. 551, 232 Pac. 275 (1925)
State v. Malonej, 135 Wash.
Kallas, 133 Wash. 23, 233 Pac. 315 (1925)
State v. Panovwh, 136 Wash. 20, 238 Pac. 903
309, 237 Pac. 726 (1925)
(1925) State v. Davis, 137 Wash. 288, 242 Pac. 31 (1926)
31Anderson, Kallas, Maloney, and Panovich cases, supra. The briefs
are of little assistance in determining the purpose for which the evidence
was offered in all except the Kallas case, where it does appear that it was
offered to prove knowledge on part of defendant.
"Davis case, note 36, supra, at p. 291.
19140 Wash. 202, 248 Pac. 405 (1926).
10At page 203, the court says: "The purpose of the admission in cases
of this character is to establish the knowledge of the person being prosecuted of the character of the business being conducted. Evidence of reputation is, therefore, unnecessary in a case where an owner is on trial, who
is conducting the business unassisted by any agent or servant or employee.
In such case, the general rule should apply that reputation, which is hearsay evidence, is not proof upon which a conviction can be had." The only
cases cited are State v. Brooks, 74 Kans. 175, 85 Pac. 1013 and the
Perrin case, note 34, supra, both of which hold that evidence is admissible
to prove knowledge but neither of which expresses any intimation that a
limitation exists.
"XState v. Fairfield, 140 Wash. 349, 248 Pac. 810 (1926) affirmed on
rehearing, 143 Wash. 355, 255 Pac. 661 (1927) State v. Espeland,141 Wash.
364, 251 Pac. 562 (1926) State v. Stuttard, note 43, snfra, State v. Mavros,
144 Wash. 340, 258 Pac. 21 (1927) State v. Costello, 45 Wash. Dec. 477,
260 Pac. 1073 (1927).
"EspeZand case, note 41, supra, follows Radoff case, supra, notes 39
and 40; Stuttard, Mavros and Costello cases, note 41, supra, exclude the
evidence where sales proved by defendant.
13143 Wash. 426, 255 Pac. 663 (1927).
"at p. 429.
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with knowledge thereof, it has then established actual
knowledge of the character of the place, and that presumptive knowledge may not then be shown by reputation,
evidence. But if the state's evidence shows only facts
from which knowledge may be inferred or presumed, or
if the state fails to show any such facts, it may, in either
of reputation to show presumptive
case, offer evidence
45
knowledge."
The Washington court considers the evidence hearsay and says
it is excluded because of lack of necessity for its use 48 and because,
of the extremely prejudicial effect, which the court mentions 47 such
evidence no doubt has on the issue of the actual character of the
place.
In the Washington cases, defendent's knowledge of the character
of the place as being a place for the unlawful sale of intoxicating
liquor is, perhaps unjustifiably, 8 assumed by the court always to
,",Attention is called to the fact that this statement is in part dictum.
The Stuttard case only decided that the evidence will be excluded, if
offered to prove knowledge, when actual sales have been made by the
defendant.
The statement is also here made that a sale is direct proof of the
act prohibited by the statute; but the statement is not accurate. The
statute, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 7328 reads: "Any person who opens up, conducts or maintains, either as principal, or agent, any place for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, be and hereby is defined to be a
'jointist'." There are cases which have held that proof of a sale is not
essential (State v. Kichinko, 122 Wash. 251, 210 Pac. 364 (1922) and cases
therein cited) and, moreover, where a sale has been proved it does not
necessarily result that the one Who makes the sale is a "jointist" State v.
Bussit, 121 Wash. 314, 209 Pac. 523 (1922). For a discussion of what constitutes the crime, see State v. Pistona,127 Wash. 171, 219 Pac. 859 (1923)
and cases there cited.
'1 See statement from Radoff case in note 40, supra. This same statement is quoted in both the Fairfieldand Stuttard cases.
11"Its effect is usually more prejudicial than any direct evidence could
possibly be, and impels the conclusion that it should be resorted to only in
these cases that come clearly under the rule"- and then follows the statement above quoted.
"Upon analysis the argument appears very strong that knowledge is
not an issue in all "jointist" cases. As was pointed out in the text above,
the issue involved in these cases, and in particular under the Washington statute, are two in number- The defendant (1) opens up, conducts
or maintains a place, and (2) that that place is one for the unlawful sale
of intoxicating liquors.
As to the first issue: The statute provides that it may be either as
principal or agent, which, in other terms, is as owner or employee. As
to the methods of proof: If the evidence is to the effect that the defendant
is owner, he may be shown to be either (a) active or (b) inactive in
the operation of the place. As active owner, he may be either (a') sole
operator or (a") aided in its operation by another. Under a" he may be
shown to be either (a"a) participant by his own act in the illegality or
(a"b) a non-participant by direct acts in the illegality although present
at the place. Proof under a"a would be either (a"aa) evidence of sales
by him or (a"ab) of other acts by hin connected with the operation of
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be a relevant issue. Proceeding, however, on the theory that the
court's assumption is correct, one faces the court's position that m
some cases, as for example, where the defendant has sole control of
the place as a joint. It is submitted that in situations a' and a"a no issue
of knowledge of the character of the place ever arises in proving that defendant has opened up, conducted or maintained the place. The thing
-to be proved is that the defendant acted and that his acts amount to the
opening up, conducting or maintaining of a place. A person being legally
responsible for his own act, regardless of whether or not he knows that
the acts he does are illegal, there can be no question of knowledge. As to
the decisions of the Washington court-it has held that evidence of reputation of the place is inadmissible under situations a' and a"aa but have
held the evidence admissible in situation a'ab. The reason given in the
first two types of cases (a' and a"aa) where the evidence has been held
inadmissibl_ is that' actual knowledge has been proved. It is submitted
that here the result is correct but the reason wrong because knowledge in
those situations is irrelevant. As to the third type of cases, a"ab, it is
submitted that the court is wrong in admitting the evidence; no issue of
knowledge arises to be proved under this situation of fact and consequently reputation evidence has no place in proof of this issue. C!.
Everett v. Sirnmons, 86 Wash. 276, 280, 150 Pac. 414 (1915).
There are two more types of cases involving an owner, however, described above as a'b and b. In both these situations the owner is not being
charged as for his own illegal act but the illegal act of another for which
he is legally responsible if it be shown that he assented to the illegal acts
-that is, that he had knowledge thereof.
As to a defendant charged as agent or employee the same situations
might arise as above except that as agent he could not be held if his
employment was such that it has no connection whatsoever with the illegal
purposes for which the place is operated.
The result is that knowledge comes into issue only in those cases
where no illegal act or acts directly connected with the illegal purpose are
proved against the defendant charged, whether as principal or agent.
Then to proceed to the other issue of the case, 1.e., the character of
the place. One glance at this issue shows that the defendant's knowledge
has absolutely nothing to do with this phase of the case; it matters not
one whit whether the defendant knows or does not know its actual character when it comes to legal proof of that fact. There does, however, arise,
in proving this issue, a question of intent on the part of the owner or
operator-but intent is not knowledge; the two are entirely separate and
distinct facts.
Under the Washington decisions, that a place is a "joint" may be
shown by proving actual sales (note plural) at the place or by showing
in some manner the purpose for which the place is operated. If sales are
proved they may be either by defendant or by his agent or tenant. Either
one equally well establishes the actual character of the place. If sales
are not shown, it must, or if shown, in addition thereto, it may be shown
what the purpose of the place was by showing circumstances such as a
single sale, possession of liquor, equipment consisting of glasses, bottles
and the like, drunkenness on the premises or any other relevant physical
fact and for the intent of those who operate the place. The intent may
be inferred from written statements, declarations, etc., from circumstances
as above, or from the defendant's knowledge of the purpose for which the
place is operated. However, that the intent may be inferred from knowledge, does not seem to lead to the conclusion that knowledge is always
an element in these cases. It would seem more logical to say that in those
cases where knowledge becomes a factor in the first issue, the intent can
be inferred from the fact of knowledge, if proved, and in those cases
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the place,40 or where he makes sales in the place, 50 his knowledge
of the character of the place is regarded as so directly proved that
additional circumstantial proof in the form of reputation evidence
is unnecessary The court entertains the view that where he has
sole control of the place, he must know what is going on there, i. e.,
he must know of the unlawful purpose for which the place is being
conducted or maintained, that where he sells liquor in the place,
he must know of the unlawful purpose in a similar way
The question is whether the Washington court has not placed
an unnecessary limitation on the rule. This question of limitation
has two aspects. first, the general one, whether there should be a
limitation at all, and second, whether, if a limitation is justified,
the one laid down by the court is a proper one.
As to the first aspect, it would seem that any limitation which
would exclude relevant circumstantial evidence tending to prove
the issue merely because there is direct evidence to prove the issue
is unwarranted. An examination of the cases, 51 both American and
English, wherein reputation evidence has been held as competent
in proof of knowledge of a fact in issue, reveals no cases wherein
wherein knowledge is not a factor in proving the first issue above, then

the necessary intent can be inferred from the facts which are proved to
establish the first issue, for such acts are those of the defendant which,
having himself done, the law presumes that he intended.
However, as far as reputation evidence of the place is concerned it
has no place in proof of any element of the second issue, from whatever
angle it is approached, as far as authority of cases and the text-writers
is concerned (the Oklahoma cases cited in note 33, supra, to the contrary)
for it is not admissible to prove the fact itself nor is it admissible to prove
intent. That, indirectly, intent may be inferred from knowledge proved
by reputation evidence in certain types of cases should not lead to its
admissibility in any other cases than where it is admissible for the direct
purpose of proving knowledge. Consequently the use of reputation evidence should be limited strictly to those cases wherein it is revelant to
prove knowledge as a factor, which in jomtist cases is, as pointed out
above, not in every case, but only in a limited class of cases.
The result of this analysis would lead to the conclusion that the
Washington court has correctly limited the use of evidence of reputation
of the place to those cases wherein knowledge is a factor .but that it has
not correctly defined and limited the cases wherein knowledge does
bcome a factor, with the result that the evidence has been held admissible in some cases, i. e., those wherein defendant, either as principal or
agent, has been shown to have directly participated in the illegality without having made sales, when it should have been excluded.
Qadof! and Espeland cases, notes 39 and 41, supra.
z Stuttard, Mavros and Costelo cases, note 41, supra, Contra Maloney
case, note 36, supra.
11Cases cited WHAnToN C-an. EvID. 378, 3 WIGUOBE, EVIENCE, 821
et seq, note 33, supra.
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it has been held52 that such evidence would be excluded when other
independent proof, either direct or circumstantial, of the same fact
was offered. There seems to be no rule that circumstantial evidence
in the form of hearsay which is admissible under an exception to
the rule, should be excluded because there is direct evidence on the
53

same issue.

As to the second aspect, to-wit, whether, if limitation is justified,
a desirable one has been laid down, it would seem that if the rule
of necessity is to be invoked at all as requiring a limitation, then
necessity ought to be carried to its natural limits, namely, that
reputation evidence should be excluded whenever there is other
direct or circumstantial evidence tending to show knowledge. To
permit circumstantial evidence in the form of reputation to be
used in aid of other circumstantial evidence on the same issue, but
not in aid of other direct evidence on the same issue, seems to be
without support in the authorities. Circumstantial evidence is
frequently more cogent than direct testimony because it is less
likely to be fabricated. 4 On the theory of necessity as applied by
the supreme court, reputation evidence ought perhaps only to be
admitted where there is no other proof, either direct or circumstantial, tending to show knowledge. That it may be admitted
under such conditions the court suggests,55 although in State v.
to decide whether
Perrnn the court found it "not necessary
proof of reputation such as that suggested would alone be sufficient
to sustain the conviction."
The present rule would seem, in one view, to put the admissibility
of evidence to a considerable extent to the election of the prosecutor, in another view, to make him choose at his peril.
However that may be, all of the cases cannot be reconciled, even
on the theory adopted by the court in the Stuttard case, which to
some extent appears to be an attempt to restate the results of the
58
earlier cases. At least one case is directly overruled, although
without mention, by the Stuttard case. The rule as stated seems
12The only case found wherein it was even intimated that such might
be the rule is Ward v. Herndon, 5 Port. (Ala.) 382, 385 (1837) where it
where positive proof cannot be had of such knowledge, it
was said, "
is competent to prove a circumstance, from which it is inferable." But
statement was dictum in this regard as evidence was admitted.
"See Comm. v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39 Atl. 211 (1898), and State v.
Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 Pac. 356 (1897).
54Comm. v. Webster 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711 (1850).
"
or if the state fails to show and such facts.
0 Stuttart case: "
State v. Maloney, note 36, supra, in this case the report reads,
intoxicating liquors were sold in the place
the evidence shows
by him."
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to lead to an overruling of at least one other earlier case on its
facts, namely, the Anderson case,57 where the defendant was engaged in handling the liquor but not in making actual sales, which
evidence, under the facts of the case, seems just as direct proof of
the knowledge of the conduct of the place for the purpose of the
sale as an actual sale, it being borne in mind at all times that proof
s
of an actual sale is not necessary to prove the defendant a jointist,
5
Morea fact winch the court at times appears to have overlooked.
80
would almost appear
over, the facts set forth in State v. Perrmn
to be such direct proof of knowledge as to exclude, under the present theory of the court, any additional circumstantial evidence to
the same end.t
AixRED
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PROVISIONS IN A WILL FORFEITING THE SHARE OF A CONTESTING

BERNIiARY'l-Provisions in will forfeiting the share of a contesting beneficiary are not contrary to public policy 2 It is suggested
by the English courts that no question of public policy is involved,
that the court has no interest whatever apart from the interests of
the parties themselves, and that it matters not to the state whether
"Note 36, supra.
"See note 45, supra, second paragraph.
'See note 33, supra, and especially State v. Stuttard, cited therein.
127 Wash, at pp. 194-195.
t After this note had gone to press, the court, in a decision handed
down on March 19th, 1928, State v. Wilson et al., 47 Wash. Dec. 120, held
reputation evidence inadmissible as against the appellant, proprietor and
operator of a hotel wherein sales were proved by employees; no sales were
proved by the appellant although court below found that he participated in
and had knowledge of the handling of liquor in the hotel. The opinion is
short and relies upon a citation of the Radoff and Espeland cases and
states: "Again we announce the rule that reputation evidence is not admissible in cases of this character, where there is direct and positive testimony showing knowledge on the part of the owner or proprietor." No
attempt is made by the court to explain this holding, which without doubt,
throws greater doubt upon the earlier cases, criticized above; the conclusion reached in the foregoing discussion seems to now have support in
tis decision, although, unfortunately, the court does not make more than
a general statement supporting the opinion which it hands down.
3For form of clauses see: 1 CuTLER's TiFAwy FoRm Boox 2139 (no
provision for gift over) 1 NICHOLS' ANNo. FoRms 2267, sec. 157 In re
In re Bergland's
Ohappel's Estate, 127 Wash. 638, 221 Pac. 336 (1923)
Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 Pac. 277, 5 A.L.R. 1363 (1919) In re Kitchen's
Estate, 192 Cal. 384, 220 Pac. 301, 30 A.L.R. 1008 (1923) In re Keenan's
Will, 188 Wis. 163, 205 N. W 1001, 42 A L.R. 836 (1925) Cook v. Turner,
15 M. & W 727, 71 Rev. Rep. 808 (1846).
'Rogers v. Law, 66 U. S. 253, 1 Black 253, 17 L. Ed. 58 (1862)
Smithsonan Institution 'a. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 18 Sup. Ct. 396, 42 L. Ed.
In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 Pac. 443, 21 L.R.A.
793 (1898)
In re Miller's Estate, 156 Cal. 119, 103 Pac. 842, 23
(N.S.) 953 (1909)
L.R.A. (N.S.) 868 (1909) In re Sh rley's Estate, 180 Cal. 400, 181. Pac.
777 (1919) In re Bergland?'s Estate, note 1, supra, In re Kitchen's Estate,
note 1, supra, Moran v. Moran, 144 Ia. 451, 123 N. W 202, 30 L.R.A.

